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Abstract: This paper addresses the issue of voter 
identification and authentication, voter participation and 
trust in the electoral system. A multimodal/hybrid 
identification and authentication scheme is proposed which 
captures what a voter knows – PIN, what he has – 
smartcard and what he is – biometrics. Massive 
participation of voters in and out of the country of origin 
was enhanced through an integrated channel (kiosk and 
internet voting). A multi-trust voting system is built based 
on service oriented architecture. Microsoft Visual C#.Net, 
ASP.Net and Microsoft SQL Server 2005 Express Edition 
components of Microsoft Visual Studio 2008 was used to 
realize the Windows and Web-based solutions for the 
electronic voting system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In a democratic system of governance, election is very 
crucial and the integrity of the electoral process is 
sacrosanct. The electoral process includes registration of 
voters, voting, tallying and collation.  
The Council of Europe recommendations defined 
electronic voting (e-Voting) as “the use of electronic means 
in at least the casting of the vote” [1]. e-Voting is a major 
issue of concern in governance especially in developing 
nations. Electronic elections are still an emerging field [1]. 
The punch card was the earliest e-Voting system used in 
the 1960s [2].  The optical scan machine is another e-
Voting system that can read a voter’s mark on a ballot. The 
Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machine is the most 
recent. The voter enters his choices into electronic storage 
via a touch-screen, push buttons, or similar device. The 
voter’s choices are stored in these machines via a 
removable memory  
 
 
cartridge, diskette or smart-card and added to the choices of 
all other voters. Bellis affirmed that the DRE machine has 
been extensively used in Brazil, India, Venezuela and 
United States of America [2]. In  
 
 
2004, more than 27% of US counties used DRE 
technology, an increase of 13% over 2000 election [3]. 
In kiosk/polling place e-Voting, dedicated machines are 
used in polling stations to enable the voters cast their votes. 
This form has the advantage that it can be thoroughly 
supervised. In remote e-Voting, voters are able to mark and 
cast their votes on the Internet or telephone but supervision  
 
 
is limited. Though, remote e-Voting has an advantage of 
convenience [4] for the voter which can enhance turnout, it 
is fraught with problems which include: privacy and 
anonymity infringement, vote buying, vote coercion, 
vulnerability to attack, audit trail may not be possible, etc 
[5, 6, 7, 8, 9].  
Internet voting (i-Voting) had been employed in countries 
like United Kingdom, Estonia, Canada and Switzerland. 
Table 1 shows the list of countries with e-Voting projects 
by type and year of first usage and figure 1 shows the 
world map of e-Voting 
Table 1:List of Countries with e-Voting Projects by Type 
and Year [20] 
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   Figure 1: World Map of E-Voting           [29] 
 
In order to design and develop an e-Voting system that is 
suitable for large-scale elections, it is expedient that some 
acceptable public standards be observed. Burmester and 
Magkos in [14] identified some of these standard 
requirements as follows:  
(1) Security [8, 15]. This standard includes the following 
properties (a) Democracy [18, 19] - Only eligible voters 
can cast votes, and no voter can cast more than one vote. 
(b) Accuracy [18, 19] - No vote can be altered, duplicated 
or eliminated without being detected. (c) Privacy [8, 16, 
19] - All votes remain secret while the voting process is 
taking place, and each individual vote cannot be linked to 
the voter who cast it. For uncoercibility, no voter should be 
able to prove the value of his/her vote to another party. (d) 
Verifiability [8, 17, 18, 19] - Any observer can be 
convinced that the election is accurate and that the 
published tally is correctly computed from votes that were 
correctly cast and (e) Robust [16, 17] - All security 
requirements are fully satisfied, despite the failure and/or 
malicious behaviour by any coalition of parties (voters, 
authorities, outsiders).  
(2) Practical. This standard includes the following 
properties (a) Convenience [15, 16, 17, 19] (b) 
Conformance with standard platforms and technologies. (c) 
Accessibility by the disabled [15, 17]. (d) Performance 
irrespective of the size of the election, and (e) Extensive 
testing - so as to enhance trust and confidence from 
officials and the public. 
The electoral process includes registration of voters, 
voting, tallying and collation. Kofler et al., (2003) 
identified two fundamental elements in any e-Voting 
system (i) The registration process during which the voters 
is identified and authenticated and (ii) The voting process 
where the voter cast his vote. 
Before a voter can cast a vote, he has to register. In order to 
identify a voter, three fundamental criteria can be used to 
differentiate the technologies. These according to Krimmer 
et al., (2007) are: (a) what he knows, (b) what he has and 
(c) what he is. Biometrics is what you are. These following 
techniques of identification are used in e-Voting system: (i) 
Username and Password (Personal Identification – PIN) - 
the voter is identified because he knows the PIN. (ii) 
Transaction Number (TAN) - the voter possesses 
something that identifies him. (iii) Smart-Cards - this also 
identifies him when his properties are read as stored on the 
card and (iv) Biometrics - the voter himself identifies 
himself with his biometric properties. A hybrid of these 
identification technologies can be explored in e-Voting 
system. 
In PIN-based e-Voting systems, the voter logs in to the 
system with his PIN and he is identified. He is then allowed 
to access and fill the ballot. An example is the Active 
Transport Society Elections [21]. The voter logins with a 
one-time security code, fill the ballot and cast his vote, 
where cryptography is used to secure the communication 
between the browser and the election server. In this system, 
security is based on the integrity of the election 
commission and server administration.  
In TAN-based e-Voting systems, the voter is issued with a 
transaction number with which he can cast his vote. The 
number is usually generated by a trust center. The 
connection between a voter and the election server is also 
cryptographically secured [26]. The European Union (EU) 
student vote system is a TAN-based Internet application 
system used to vote for EU student council [22]. The 
communication between the voter and the election system 
is encrypted with a key issued by a trust center [26].  
Another example of a TAN-based election system is the 
one for the election of the Jugendgemeinderat (young city 
council), an advisory board at Fellbach, German, 2001 
[23]. Figure 2 expresses the various levels of elections. 
 
Figure 2: Levels of Election [1] 
 
First and second level elections are legally binding and of 
higher political importance. They are regulated by law 
(example - the Nigerian Electoral Act 2010) and the results 
of the elections have consequences. The most rigid legal 
framework being the first level elections. Though PIN-
based and TAN-based election systems are relatively cheap 
to implement, they do not have a legal foundation as a basis 
of identification and authentication. Distribution of TAN 
for each election can be expensive and susceptible to error. 
Hence, PIN-based and TAN-based systems cannot be used 
for first and second level elections. 
The use of smartcard is another means of identification in 
e-Voting systems. Some smartcard-based e-Voting system 
uses smartcard for digital signature and enables 
cryptographic protocols. The Sensus system [24] and the 
German i-Vote [25] system utilize the blind signature based 
  
algorithm. The algorithm follows a one-stage approach 
where the voter fills a ballot sheet which is then blinded 
and signed. It is encrypted and sent to the registration 
server which authenticates the digital signature of the voter. 
The authenticated ballot sheet is then sent to the ballot 
server. In this type of system, registration and voting is 
done in a single phase. The limitation [26] is that if the 
registration server and the ballot box server are able to 
collude, voter anonymity can be compromised and his 
privacy infringed upon. 
Kalu-Mba and Ofodile, (2010) developed a secure e-Voting 
system where voters identification and authentication is 
multimodal based on biometrics, smartcard and Voter 
Identification Number (VIN) [12]. In their work, they 
incorporated multilingual audio facilities in English and 
three major Nigerian languages: Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo to 
allow the active participation of the disabled/impaired ones. 
Voters’ participation is limited to citizens living in the 
country alone. Nigerians living outside the country cannot 
participate. Election system architecture is one-phased. 
Ayo and Babajide in [27] developed a secure i-Voting 
system where identification and authentication was based 
on multimodal features also, such as biometrics and PIN.  
Audio was also incorporated. The limitation was that the 
architecture was one-phased. 
In this work, the objective is to emphasis on e-Voting 
model implementation in developing nations and one of 
which is Nigeria. We also address the issue of security by 
employing a multimodal means of identification and 
authentication that captures what the voter knows, what he 
has and what he is [12, 13]. Also, massive voter 
participation issue is considered where voters in and out of 
the country are given chances to participate in the 
democratic government of their country. The system has 
two channels through which vote can be cast and these 
channels are integrated. These are: through the kiosk (e-
Voting Machine (EVM)) and the Internet. Trust issue is 
very paramount in e-Voting system. The voters need to 
have confidence in the voting system so that they can 
believe in it. Hence, we leverage on service oriented 
computing theory to develop a multi-trust e-Voting system.  
The remaining part of the paper is succinctly arranged as 
follows: section 2 enunciates on the service-oriented 
computing theory, section 3 discusses the architectural 
framework and section 4 the conclusion. 
 
2. Service-Oriented Computing 
 
According to Papazoglou [10], Service Oriented 
Computing (SOC) is the computing paradigm that utilizes 
services as fundamental elements for developing 
applications using Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). 
Service Orientation is a paradigm for developing and 
deploying application quickly and cost effectively [30]. 
SOA applications are developed using component-based 
software development approach, with reuse in mind.  In 
SOA, software components are encapsulated as services. 
SOA builds applications by seeing components therein as a 
set of interacting services. Services encapsulate business 
functionality. It is a function performer. Services are 
autonomous and platform-independent. Services enable 
access to one or more capabilities with prescribed interface. 
Services can be described, published, discovered, and 
dynamically assembled for developing massively 
distributed, interoperable, evolvable systems [11]. Other 
service characteristics are: loose coupling, reusability, 
autonomy, statelessness. Services can also be composed to 
provide higher functionality for distributed applications 
[31]. 
 
3. Architectural Framework 
 
Based on Purba in [28], we proposed a 3-tier Enterprise 
Application Architecture as represented in figure 3, with 
the introduction of the SOA services layer to the business 
tier. 
 
          Figure 3: Enterprise Application Architecture  
 
A trust-based multi-phase voting protocol was used while 
the election process was done in phases and they were 
rendered as web services.  
The SOA-based e-Voting services are illustrated in figure 
4. 
            
  
Figure 4: SOA-Based e-Voting Services 
In figure 4, the service providers advertise their services by 
publishing to the service repository. The electoral 
commission is the service client/consumer. The service 
client finds related services from the service repository and 
composes services using service orchestration paradigm. 
After which the service client binds to the appropriate 
service providers at the instance of each voter. A sample 
voter interaction with such system is shown in figure 5.  
 
    Figure 5: Voter Interaction with the e-Voting System 
Trust, in this model, is distributed among the following 
participants in the system: Registration authority, trust 
center 1, voting authority, tallying authority and trust center 
2. 
Voter interaction with the system is as follows: 
Step 1:  Eligible voters register before the start of 
elections. Registration is done continuously except at a 
legislated time. For example, according to the 
amended Nigeria Electoral Act 2010, it is 30 days 
before the commencement of the elections.  
Step 2: On the Election Day, a voter is authenticated as 
eligible by the registration authority and given a token. 
Step 3:  A voter also obtain another token from the Trust 
Center 1. This is to reduce the possibility of collusion 
in order to break the voter’s privacy property [26]. 
Step 4: These two tokens are presented to the voting 
authority to request for a ballot. 
Step 5: He fills the ballot, cast it and obtain a receipt. The 
cast ballot is transmitted to trust center 2 as a backup 
for security reason.  
At close of election, the votes are collated by the tallying 
authority and result is announced. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The advent of electronic voting is indeed a revolution of 
the traditional paper based voting system. e-Voting system 
has helped in the automation of the traditional voting 
system and hence its efficiency. Electronic model of voting 
has been largely embraced in the developed world from 
Estonia to Switzerland and the United States of America to 
mention a few. There is a need for developing nations to 
embrace the technology in their democratic system. It is 
also necessary to fully explore the benefits entrenched in 
the e-Voting model. 
The multimodal, multi-trust, integrated e-Voting model 
ensures voters’ identification and authentication, massive 
voter participation in and out of country of origin and 
enhances voters’ trust. Its underlying voting scheme is such 
that the trust assumptions are distributed on many trusted 
authorities. The e-Voting system also takes cognizance of 
the universal e-Voting system standards and requirements 
in its implementation. 
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